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WEST YIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
"The decisive argument, however, was and is that the ab-
sence of responsibility to some external authority is bad for
the schools themselves. This fact, which Minor had early rec-
ognized, is patent to any one who has visited a large num-
ber of law schools. It is apparent even in schools which, be-
cause they have virtually a local monopoly of legal education,
are under no pressure to reduce their standards. It takes
here the form of a certain listlessness. The teachers are
tempted to sink into that condition of uninspired placidity
Which is only too characteristic of many American college pro-
fessors. That law teachers, as a class, move on a higher plane
of efficiency than their colleagues in the colleges of liberal
arts is undoubtedly attributable in part to their greater meas-
ure of accountability." 8
He quotes Professor Minor to the effect that it is better for the
law schools,
"As well as the young gentlemen who graduate therein, that
they should not enjoy this exclusive privilege; but that their
fitness to practise law should be tested in the same way with
students in private offices or in private law schools." 7
-L. C.
THE ASSIGNA1ILITY OF AN OPTION CONTRACT.-The authorities
are in conflict as to the assignability of an unexercised land option
contract.' Of course, if the option is expressly assignable,2 or is
clearly personal to the offeree,' no question arises. The intention of
the parties governs. Where the option is silent upon the point, most
-courts, hold it assignable and permit the assignee of the holder of
the option, after acceptance, to have a bill for specific performance
against the optionor.4 West Virginia, however, and a few other
- P. 267.
P. 250. It will be recalled that a bill was introduced at the recent session
of the West Virginia Legislature for the purpose of extending the diploma privi-
lege to schools of other states. Instead of attempting this, it would seem well worth
consideration whether the privilege ought not utterly to be abolished.
1 The cases are collected and commented upon In WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 415
in 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 115, note; and in 27 R. C L. 345, 346.
2 Simmons v- Zimmerman, 144 Cal. 256, 79 Pac. 451 (1904) ; Fulton v. Messen-
ger, 61 W. Va. 477, 56 S. E. 830 (1907); Wheeling Creek Co., v. Elder, 170 Fed.
215 (1909).
3 Aidrew v. Meyerdirck, 87 Md. 511, 40 AtI. 173 (1898); Myers v'. Stone, 128
Ia. 10, 102 N. W. 507 (1905). See also Rice v. Gibbs, 40 Neb. 264, 58 N. W. 724+
(1894) ; Snow v. Nelson, 113 Fed. 353 (1902).
& See note 1, supra.
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jurisdictions, have taken a contrary view.' This seems wrong.
An offer to sell land is a promise.8 If the offer is under seal, the
historical significance of the seal, where the common law rule is
still in force, makes the promise binding.7 The giving of a consider-
ation for the offer, although the latter is not under seal, has the
same effect. This is because the offer in either case, is also a contract,
preliminary and incidental to a further contract of purchase and
sale, it is true, nevertheless a contract in itself.' Since the promise
contained in the offer is conditioned upon acceptance, no liability
arises until that event.9 Meanwhile, however, the offeror is under
a duty not to revoke his offer. And if the offer, instead of itself be-
ing given under seal or for a consideration, is accompanied by an
express collateral promise, under seal or for a consideration, to keep
the offer open during the specified period, the same is true, for the
same reasons.10 But not only is the offeror, in all of these situations,
under a duty not to revoke the offer; he is actually powerless to do
so. By declaring the offer irrevocable, both law and equity specifi-
cally enforce this duty and render any attempted revocation in-
effectual.1 Once the offer is made under any of the circumstances
mentioned, the offeror cannot withdraw his offer so as to prevent
the offeree from bringing a contract of purchase and sale into
existence by acceptance. 2 Thus, the offeree, during the period spe-
cified and prior to acceptance, has something more than the mere
power or privilege of the ordinary offeree, subject as it is to the
offeror's privilege of revocation, to create by acceptance the con-
templated main contract of purchase and sale. He has a contract
right to do so, and the additional assurance that any attempted
a Rease v. Kittle. 56 W. Va. 269, 49 S. E. 150 (1904) ;wheeling Creek Co. V.
Elder, 170 Fed. 215 (1909): Vanderlip v. Peterson, 16 Manitoba L. Rep. 341;
Newton v. Newton, 11 R. 1. 390,23 Am. Rep. 476 (1876). See comment on this case
in note 18, post.
6 See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 25.
Donnally v. Parker, 5 W. Va. 301 (1872) ; Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 8 S.
E. 743 (1888) ; Watkins v. Robertson, 105 Va. 269, 54 S. E. 33 (1906). See WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS, §§ 61, 217; Pound, "Consideration in Equity," 13 ILL. L. REV.
667.
s Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 8 S. E. 743 (1888) ; Swift v. Erwin, 104 Ark.
459, 148 S. W. 267, 269 (1912). See also WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 61.
9 See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, §§ 25, 61.
bid. § 61.
u Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 743, 8 S. E. 743, (1888) ; Tibbs v. Zirkle, 55
W. Va. 49, 46 S. E. 701 (1904) ; Rease v. Kittle, supra; Watkins v. Robertson, 105 Va.
269, 54 S. E. 33 (1906) ; Pyle v. Henderson, 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. U. 762 (1909). See
also WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 61.
" Logically, perhaps, the optionor should have the power to break his subsidiary
contractual obligation not to revoke, with resulting responsibility in damages, so as to
be able actually to prevent the creation of the contemplated main contract by accept-
ance. See LANGDELL, SUmmARY, § 178; ASHLEY ON CONTRACTS, § 13. The result indi-
cated in the text seems to have been reached mainly on the practical ground of com-
mercial convenience.
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breazh of the offcor's correlative duty not to revoke will not dis-
turb his position.
Once the option is exercised and the contract of purchase and sale
is created, the prospective purchaser acquires a new contract right
against the owner to obtain title to the land, a right enforceable at
law in an action for damages and in equity by a bill for specific per-
formance. And as a concomitant of the availability of the latter
remedy, he acquires an equitable interest in the land.
This right of the holder of an unexercised option to acquire fur-
ther contractual rights in personam and in rem, even though it
does not become an equitable interest in the land until the offer is
accepted,"' is nevertheless as valuable a commercial asset as an
interest in the land and "should partake of an ordinary incident of
property, like assignability."4 Thus, although it is not available to
creditors of the optionee upon equitable execution, 15 an unexercised
option may be taken and sold by the optionee's assignee in bank-
ruptcy,16 or by a receiver appointed to wind up his affairs' 7 and
at his death it goes to the personal representative for the benefit of
those entitled to the personalty."8 And certainly the same considera-
tions of commercial expediency which brought about the historical
development resulting in the assignability of contracts generally,
and the irrevocability of options given undeP seal or for a considera-
tion,'" demand that this preliminary contractual right be assigna-
ble unless the parties have expressly stipulated otherwise.
It remains to notice particularly the case of Rease v. Kittle, in
which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia enunciated
the doctrine under discussion, and which has been followed by a
" Rease v. Kittle, supra. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 61, note 89 ; Pound,
"Progress of the Law, 1918-19 : Equity," 33 HARv. L. REV. 825, note 59. But
see CLARK, P INCIPLES OF EQUITY, § 111 and 26 HARv. L. REV. 747. Of course an un-
exercised option constitutes a restraint upon alienation of the land within the rule
against perpetuities, Woodallv. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S. E. 170 (1915). See TrF-
VANY ON REAL PROPERTY, 2 ed., 607-08.
14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 415.
Is Because the option is not yet an equitable interest In the land. Sweezy v. Jones,
65 Ia. 272, 21 N. W. 603 (1884) ; Provident Co. v. Milis, 91 Fed. 435 (1899).
16 Morgan v. Rhodes, 1 M. & K. 435 (1834) ; Buckland U. Papillon, (1866) L. R. 1
Eq. 477.
17 Blank v. Independent Ice Co., 152 Ia. 241, 133 N. W. 344 (1911).
1s This is clearly the correct view, for the option being A right only to acquire
further 'contract rights, is personalty. McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257, 41
At. 840 (1898) ; Newton v. Newton. 11 R. I. 390, 23 Am. Rep. 476 (1876) seems to
be opposed to this view, but it is submitted that what really actuated that decision was
a feeling upon the part of the court that because of the curious facts of thq case, it
would be unwise ftr the administrator to exercise the option, in that the rights of
creditors of the estate would thereby be seriously injured. There was also some evi-
dence that the parties to the option had understood that it was to be personal to the
optionee. The very few cases on this subject are collected and discussd in 43 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 118, note.
10 See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, ch. 14, and see note 12, supra.
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Federal court sitting in this state.20 Kittle, for a consideration, gave
Howell an option to buy coal land for a certain cash price at any
time during five years. Kittle shortly afterward conveyed the land
to Womelsdorf for cash. Howell later assigned the option to Rease.
Rease then exercised the option and tendered the price to Kittle. A
conveyance being refused, he brought a bill for specific perfor-
mance against Kittle, Womelsdorf, Howell, and certain creditors of
Kittle. A demurrer was interposed. The lower court granted the
relief sought. Womelsdorf appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed the decree, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill.
The main ground relied upon was that an unexercised option, al-
though irrevocable because given for a consideration, is neverthe-
less essentially an offer, and can therefore be accepted only by the
person to whom it is made. This phase of the problem has already
been discussed. An option is not merely an offer. It is also a con-
tract, made distinctive by its specific enforceability. That is, its con-
tractual features are more noteworthy than its characteristics as an
offer. And "it seems reasonable where a contract right of value is
concerned (and an option often is of value) and the performance
of the offeree can be as effectively rendered by any one as by him,
that the rule generally applicable to offers should yield."'"
However, the case might well have been disposed of with the same
result on other grounds. While the option remained in Howell's
hands, unexercised, and before its assignment to Rease, Womelsdorf
purchased the land for cash from Kittle, apparently without either
actual or constructive notice of Howell's option. Whatever may be
Kittle's liability in damages, it seems clear that Womelsdorf must
have taken a title free from any claims based upon the outstanding
option.22 In other words, because of the interposition of a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice, the question of what rights
Howell later assigned to Rease does not arise. Howell himself could
not, after the conveyance to Womelsdorf without notice, have had
specific performance for the land, and his assignee stood in no
better position. That is all that the case means.
Associate Professor of Law, _M. T. Van Hecke
University of North Carolina.
= See note 5, supra.
27See WILLISTON ON CONTR.ACTS, § 415. The court also relied upon Newton V. New-
ton, but see note 18, svpra.
= See the cases collected in 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522. note, and 43 L. R. A. (1N.
S.) 1150, note. See also WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 936. note 70; and Ames, "Pur-
chaser for Value Without Notice," 1 HARV. I. REV. 1.
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